EU-China ties delicately poised ahead of summit

April Fool’s Day is an annual April 1 custom centered on practical jokes and hoaxes, but rarely is it the moment for an important political summit. However, that will change on Friday with a virtual EU-China summit, which comes at a crucial moment in relations between the two.

While the diplomatic atmosphere may be warm, relations have been jolted since the coronavirus crisis began, with a significant spike in tensions that has not been made smoother by China’s qualified support for Russia over its invasion of Ukraine. The list of issues that Beijing and Brussels have been at odds over in the last couple of years is not shortening, including human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the imposition of Hong Kong’s national security law and a long-negotiated Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, whose ratification was last year put on ice.

Perhaps most symbolically, EU foreign affairs chief Josep Borrell has called China a “systemic rival,” prompted by an incident that saw Beijing trying to pressure Brussels into diluting criticism in an EU report on coronavirus disinformation. That document, written by the European External Action Service, stated that “official and state-backed sources from various governments, including Russia and — to a lesser extent — China, have continued to widely target conspiracy narratives and disinformation.”

These challenges, which have chilled the air of EU-China relations, come in the wider context of Chinese foreign policy’s growing focus on Europe, which has fueled EU concerns that Beijing is dividing and ruling to undermine the continent’s collective interests. Take the example of the Belt and Road Initiative, which Brussels has long had reservations about, not least given frustrations over Beijing’s perceived slowness in opening up its own economy and a wave of Chinese takeovers of European firms in key industries. Numerous EU states have already signed BRI agreements, including Italy, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Greece, Malta and Portugal.

But this is by no means the only development that underlines Beijing’s growing influence across the continent, which EU officials are increasingly conscious of. Another example is the annual “16+1” initiative of China and key countries in Eastern and Central Europe. The 16+1 format aims to intensify and expand Beijing’s cooperation with 11 EU member states and five Balkan countries in the fields of investment, transport, finance, science, education and culture.

Europe is concerned that Beijing is dividing and ruling to undermine the continent’s collective interests

Andrew Hammond

Key trends are increasingly apparent in China’s external interventions in Europe. For instance, Beijing is tailoring its approach around the bespoke needs of individual states or blocs of countries, such as 16+1, and its overtures to Europe are coming with a clear quid pro quo, as underlined by countries signing up to the BRI in exchange for Chinese investment.

In this context of bilateral angst, both sides are keen to try and stress areas of common interest and cooperation. These include the importance of an open, multilateral trading system and tackling climate change.

On the economic issue, China still hopes that CAI might get ratified, despite opposition from the Biden administration. While the prospects of this getting kicked into the political long grass are growing, there might be a window following April’s French presidential election and this autumn’s National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (at which Xi is expected to secure a third term as general secretary) where compromises could mean that ratification — if both sides still think it is in their interests — might be made.

Global warming is another issue on which the two sides have long had a fruitful dialogue. They have cooperated on developing a cost-effective low-carbon economy, with the two parties accounting for about a third of global greenhouse gas emissions.

The reason EU-China discussions on climate change have been so cooperative is that, fundamentally, both share a vision of a prosperous, energy-secure future in a stable climate and recognize the need for collaboration to realize this agenda. Their 2015 agreement, for instance, agreed to intensify cooperation in domestic mitigation policies, carbon markets, low-carbon cities, greenhouse gas emissions from the aviation and maritime industries, and hydrofluorocarbons.

With appropriate vision, both sets of leaders recognize that there is a massive win-win opportunity on the horizon from accelerating the transition to a low-carbon future. So this collaboration looks set to deepen in the coming years, with Europe having clean technology strengths in areas that China needs. As the latter continues on a trajectory to potentially become the world’s largest economy, there are substantial commercial opportunities for European technology and science firms.

So, despite mounting tensions, both the EU and China can still gain from a deeper partnership on issues from trade to climate change. However, politics may not allow for this and much will depend on how the conflict in Ukraine develops and how far Beijing goes in deepening its support for Moscow.

• Andrew Hammond